Air Attack Then and Now - Tactical Ops Authority?

[H2OnBTU]

Thought I’d throw this out to see if anyone may have some historical insight…

Q: Does today’s Air Attack have more operational authority to make tactical decisions than their predecessors?

Perhaps I’m miss-remembering, but as a kid listening (Regency 10-Channel Scanner) to fires back in 70’s, it was my impression that the Air Attack worked with less operational authority than they do today. It seemed that the AA would report observations and make recommendations, but the ground contact running the fire (ICS wasn’t a thing yet) would need to bless the drop(s).

Clearly, modern day air ops have evolved (I’ll skip the details – you probably know) and it would seem to me that the AA has significantly more latitude to make operational decisions that govern the tactical operations on the ground.

Perhaps my thinking on this is whacked, or maybe the authority to make tactical decisions has simply evolved to meet the complexities of today’s incident management.

Or was there something along the way that triggered the change? Perhaps a specific incident, or maybe some Op’s wizards came up with it at a winter planning meeting?

[2ndLine1stWord]

This is an interesting question. I recently had an issue on a fire where I was working as an OPBD and we could not get on the same page as AA. And I realized in that moment, I don’t know the real world answer to this question. I was frankly tempted to tell him to fly away because what he was doing was literally counter productive to the plan on the ground.

Understand, this wasn’t an argument over tactics, it was a communication barrier, different agencies, different terminology, etc. but I started asking around to folks with far more experience than I have and I couldn’t really get an answer on this either.

I’d love if some of the heavy hitters on here could speak to this.

[ffviking]

Might be a question to ask Flyron.

[Sequ0ia]

Great question! It’s a can of worms and a very common discussion within the IMT world. Agency Administrators (AA’s) and political pressures of seeing retardant and tankers in the air is a big factor that gets pushed onto Ops Chiefs. Air Attacks push back pretty hard if there aren’t boots on the ground to follow up on drops. Which is their job- transfer of risk etc. There are many a story and example of an Ops Chief requesting retardant to pretreat to buy time before the crews are ready to implemt a plan or before the incident has enough or the right crews to pull it off. There’s real importance in the morning aviation call to ensure the air attacks, AOBD and ops are all on the same page with priorities, the plan for the day and what the contingency and future planning look like. Ego’s on both sides- ops and aviation and quite honestly educating the higher ups comes into play in a major way. Look at the Eaton, Pallisades and Lahaina for recent events where a large narrative was “where were all the air tankers” when the boots on the ground knew/know they couldn’t fly anyway. As with a lot of things in this complex environment- constant communication and relationships are crucial. Thanks for asking the question.

[crownbob]

Textbook answer is the air folks work for the IC on an IA incident and Ops when incident expands. That being said, the actual relationship often depends on the personalities involved, past experience and “street cred” for lack of a better term. In my experience as an ATGS, my role was to support the strategy that the IC announced on the initial size up, monitor progress and provide intel on whether the plan was succeeding. The IC had the ultimate authority but most were open to suggestion on adjustment to the plan, especially since I had the best view of the incident. Today the ATGS seem to have been delegated more latitude on augmenting and managing air resources, but my sample size is admittedly small

[2ndLine1stWord]

I agree. As an IC I do give almost all ordering authority to AA. I think on IA things are often more simple though because tactics are almost always going to be anchor and flank/direct attack.

I think more where the question comes in is on that extended attack fire. I think the communication is often clear between ops and AA but as you move down the chain on the ground specific circumstances can vary based on the bit of line that’s being worked. This can cause subtleties in the tactics used and sometimes require variation on the big box direction given by ops.

So, in this circumstance, overall who get to set the priorities for AA? The DIVs that’s executing their plan on the section of terrain or the AA that is often changed out multiple times during an OP period due to flight times etc?

I honestly don’t know the answer.

[IMT_Geek]

Q: “Does today’s Air Attack have more operational authority to make tactical decisions than their predecessors?”
A: Only my opinion, and some may disagree. It shouldn’t have changed but may on isolated instances due to experience, lack of communication between resources, or no experience in Operational Art. Are the ATGS duties and responsibilities longer and more evolved than the ‘70’s? Yes. But the ATGS is still one of the many Division and Group Supervisors that report up the lines of authority in the operations section that are part of the plan. That being said, please don’t misunderstand. To prevent a TLTR designation I’ll try and keep it as short as possible but may inadvertently not provide sufficient details.

It may seems that way because it involves aircraft that by their nature can be heard on scanners further away, or because you usually don’t hear lots of the ground tactical traffic minutia, the air branch may sound like they have more latitude. The most important aspect is the amount of delegated decision making and Operational Art the ATGS’s have been provided by their (insert appropriate supervisor).

One of the concepts many may not ever hear is the critically important (usually in person or on the telephone) conversations the OSC or IC has with the ATGS that should occur after the Ops meeting. The Ops meeting is not the Operational Briefing for the masses, but the closed meeting with the OSC – both on duty and the one assuming command, OPBDs, DIVS, FBAN, and IMET that meet just prior to the Operational Briefing. That should be where everyone checks what they were assigned, resources are horse traded if needed based on the last OP, and PRIORITY OF THE DIVISIONS AND GROUPS are stated. This is where Operational Art (OA) should be discussed and articulated. Based on the OA, the DIVS and OPBD will know who is the priority to support the strategy. During the conversation between the OSC and the ATGS, the priorities, strategy, and OA should be laid out. Once that is done, the ATGS should then be delegated the authority to support the plan and be part of the OA. Much of that can be behind the scenes, accomplished on different radio channels or telephone calls. The ATGS should be supporting the plan and priorities. If that isn’t happening, then the operational plan lacks focus and the OA can easily get messed up or dysfunctional. Sometimes when that happens, the ATGS will make up for the issues and may “work the problem” despite the lack of communication.

During the IA phase you may hear the critical conversations on a radio channel or often not because a cell phone is used.

Ordering is different, that’s like a DIVS going direct to the LSC for “stuff.”

A DIVS should not be the one setting priorities for all divisions, that’s the (IC/OSC) responsibility but the DIVS might set the priorities within their DIVS when that DIVS has the priority for air.

All this is out the door when folks don’t communicate. If the ground folks don’t communicate with the air folks that is a huge issue and usually leads to C2 dysfunction. You can’t pull over to the side of the road and chat when you are flying at 5K with a lot of risk flying around you.