No link to the reported report in the cbs news story you posted above?!
Here’s one that has links..
A year after LA-area wildfires destroyed thousands of homes, fewer than a dozen have been rebuilt
Fewer than a dozen homes have been rebuilt in Los Angeles County since Jan. 7, 2025, when the Palisades and Eaton fires erupted, killing 31 people and destroying about 13,000 homes and other residential properties.
For those who had insurance, it’s often not enough to cover the costs of construction. Relief organizations are stepping in to help, but progress is slow.
Southern California Fires Incident Analysis Report Released
Here is the link to the full report. It’s over 700 pages so many BRCC espresso drinks may be required.
BRCC espresso drinks ?
I think I will wait until 1700, then obtain something more suitable to attack this report. 
The report goes into enough detail that everyone will have things to contemplate and chew on. I will say that the TOC is difficult to maneuver through until you realize that the far left column of numbers are not line numbers as you would normally expect like in legal documents, but those are actually the corresponding page numbers. For me, incident management starts on page 193.
I understand the feeling that “there needs to be a review of the incident”.. been through this before. I also support science and academia… but there needs to be a basic level of acceptance as to what is and is not humanly possible.
I saw homes in the La Canada-Flintridge area that were not touched by fire.. but had portions of their roofs ripped off and at least two dozen or so that had the solar panels ripped off.
That means that the wind event was at or beyond the design basis of those structures in relation to the UBC. I have fielded questions about both fires( I worked on both) about the narrative that things were done wrong. I try and remind people that doing anything in 30 mph wind is hard.. driving, walking etc. We seem to forget that the winds that were coming off those ranges were forming “Mountain Waves”. Some were clocked at sustained speeds of over 75 mph. That is a Category 1 hurricane. We do not expect people to fight a hurricane, an earthquake or a tornado.. just a wind driven wildfire.
Agreed. We saw a lot of homes in Altadena which were outside of the fire scar, but had major roof damage and downed trees from the hurricane-force winds that accompanied the Eaton Fire. What are you realistically going to be able do under these conditions? And even after the winds eased, the blown-down trees and powerlines made operations extraordinarily complex. Check out the first few minutes of part 2 of our LA Fires documentary to see what things looked like in Altadena the next morning after the winds eased - https://youtu.be/lB2H3eGtjug?si=r2s-COcIHVVt1bu7
I was in Yellowstone in 1988 when one of the fires I was on took off (Red Shoshone? Clover Mist?). 85 mph winds, in our “safety zone” (rocky ridgetop, totally safe, maybe a mile and a half wide) people were getting knocked off their feet. Fight fire? With what?
I agree with several of the statements aired here, but tactics should not be conflated with systems, policies, procedures, laws, and guidelines. I learned long ago that “you find out just how small we are when Mother Nature’s in charge,” a comment attributed to me by the LA Times during the Angora Fire (TNF/LTBNU) in 2007. But I learned that lesson long before, as a DIVS during the Kinneloa Fire in 1993, which partially burned within the footprint of the 2024 Eaton Fire. I watched the Santa Anas dry out Bermuda grass lawns (that you normally can’t seem to kill with a blowtorch) and then dry and burn ice plant, and then torch stucco homes with concrete tile roofs and a soccer-field-sized cement pads surrounding them. We don’t belong in the face of hurricane winds and fire – the public’s expectations must be tempered and re-educated to match science and the limits of human physiology.
HOWEVER, if we are to prevent history from repeating itself, we must remember the past mistakes and omissions and review the systems, policies, procedures, laws, and guidelines that inform leadership decision-making. I am nowhere near even scratching the surface of the report yet, but the section I normally concentrate on, “Incident Management,” already documents multiple lessons learned, or, more importantly, lessons NOT learned.
I always explained to my company officers that we are sometimes completely outgunned in a firefight. Whether we are called too late or the laws of physics are beyond our capabilities, we sometimes lose. However, there is a huge difference between losing a building (or an IA) when we have fought the fire in a safe, organized, and strategic manner and losing a building (or that pesky IA) when we fought the fire unsafely, disorganized, and/or haphazardly. I will accept the former – albeit unwillingly – but I abhor the latter and refuse to permit it from being repeated. That’s what needs to happen here.