Tactics / Strategy Question - Defense In Depth or Zone Defense?

California & Hawaii Hotlist Questions and Discussion
#1

This is a tactics and possibly a strategy question.

We know that an advancing fire front casts embers 1-2 miles ahead of the main fire line.

If there is good line for a surface fire stop, and an adequate road net beyond the line, would it be practical to scatter additional fire units within mutual support range of each other to put out embers for that entire potential embercast area beyond the line? I know I am talking about thousands of acres and dozens if not hundreds of additional resources.

See the attached graphic, which is for example only:

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Another term might be “Saturation Patrol” because the goal would be to aggressively patrol the entire embercast area and extinguish small starts with shovel and backpack pump before they get a chance to grow. In some cases this would be a literal boot stomp - in others, calling in something with hose and using some gallons of water.

Also in the same area, fire units would be evaluating and prepping / defending structures per current doctrine.

Obviously this tactic would not work in unroaded areas (units can’t move around fast enough) and is dependent on vehicles (both for movement and as means of escape to safety zone), but the vehicles would not necessarily have to be Type I or III engines. They could be utilities with extra equipment, patrols or Type VIs - the ability to get in and out quick, carry gear and flow a little water.

This feels to me like the opposite of burning out, which denies embercast a receptive fuel bed between the line and the main fire front. Instead, the potential receptive fuel bed is being actively defended, beyond the line but in sight of it.

What am I not seeing? Too many embers being cast into the area to be protected? There are never enough resources for such a tactic to work? Terrain never favors this? (Although I picked an example from a current event, where it seems that terrain would.)

Or is this a current tactic and I just haven’t found the right manual to read it out of?

Thanks for any feedback.

#2

You are correct in your thought and assumptions. Yes this is and has been an available tactic. We have called it tactical patrol, patrol, mobile structure defense, etc. You are also correct in assuming that there are never enough resources to get to a comfort level and ensure success. It all depends on the mood of the fire at the time of encroachment and what kind of “fuel” the structures provide.
This is also a concept that many CALFIRE teams have used in the past. The wagon wheel concept of Division supervision includes everything in front of and interior (think of a slice of pie) to the geographic boundaries of that specific division, so that DIVS would be sole supervision in that area. This goes hand in hand with the new wildland WUI doctrine adopted in CA but not widely used yet that somewhat eliminates structure groups formally and places the responsibility on the DIVS. He/she then can assign task forces, etc within that DIV for specific purposes

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#3

Sacklunch, I will answer this as a valid question. Among the hundreds of items and lists, firefighters are trained to:

  • Follow the Standard Firefighting Orders.
  • Recognize the Watch Out Situations.
  • Recognize the Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy Fires.
  • Follow the Risk Management Process.

Placing personnel in the “green” with unburned fuel between them and the main fire, essentially at the “head” of the fire that is advancing towards your personnel is a recipe for disaster. The Common Denominators of Tragedy Fires, items that are found to be present after a tragedy gives a hint of issues.

  • Fires respond quickly to shifts in wind direction or wind speed.
  • Flare-ups generally occur in deceptively light fuels.

In trying to achieve what you are asking about, the Standard Firefighting Orders, “rules” that should not be broken, and were developed or added to after a fatality incident, include the following.

  • Identify escape routes and safety zones, and make them known.
  • Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first.

Without a concrete safety zone, not just a place to run to IF things go south and a plan to get there, is inviting disaster. Having or permitting green between you and the fire is like standing up and shouting behind enemy lines, “I am here!”

Even more telling are some of the “18 situations that shout watch out” that are present in that kind of a tactic.

  • Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
  • Constructing line without safe anchor point.
  • Attempting frontal assault on fire.
  • Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
  • Getting frequent spot fires across line.

A burn-over that was caused by an engine crew doing exactly what you described gives those without the experience of firefighting a peek into the crazy stuff that being in front of a fire produces.

“…As the engine boss and the firefighter ventured further and further into the area below (north of) the road to attack spots, they weren’t alone. xxxx crew of nine firefighters were also in the same area working on spot fires. At the same time, the winds on the road were getting very gusty, generally blowing northeast, toward the main fire. The column, going in the opposite direction, was flattening out and casting a brown shadow over Division X. The xxxxxxx Captain and his firefighters, along with Exx’ s engine boss and firefighter, dropped below a bench below the xxxxx road and were no longer visible to Exx’ s assistant fire engine operator.

The assistant fire engine operator radioed the firefighter and asked him to move back toward the engine so he could keep an eye on him. As the firefighter began moving back toward the engine, the engine boss redirected him to help with a spot fire he and the firefighters from the xxxx hand crew were working on near a grassy area they were referring to as “the meadow” (see Picture x). Unknown to the firefighters chasing spots north of xxxxx, the fire behavior at the southeast end of Division x was increasing dramatically. The xxxxxxxxxxx crew, assigned to patrol the eastern end of 1xxxxx, noticed bats flying overhead at about 1420, and several members of the xxxxx saw a bear running away from the main fire across xxxxx. Shortly thereafter, the roar of trees torching out and strong convective winds made it obvious that the fire was about to crown across the road.”

They were lucky, two personnel deployed their shelters and suffered only minor injuries.

The short answer is, that is crazy dangerous, too many people have been trapped, injured, or killed doing that kind of tactic. I thought the backstory and some doctrine might help you understand why.

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#4

Firedog1, I didn’t interpret his thoughts as the “line up on the fireline and every other person is facing the opposite way to look for spots” kind of approach. I took it as out in the middle of brush. The map used has very few roads, and access and travel would be impeded. I interpreted, maybe incorrectly, that it is suggested they make a stand at the head of the fire with people deployed in the green to try and stop spots over the line. That’s different than point protection in the WUI, but a frontal assault by putting your folks in the green to catch spots. If I interpreted the conditions he was suggesting correctly, that just is not the way it should ever be done, at least not on my watch.

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#5

If there is good line for a surface fire stop, and an adequate road net beyond the line, would it be practical to scatter additional fire units within mutual support range of each other to put out embers for that entire potential embercast area beyond the line? I know I am talking about thousands of acres and dozens if not hundreds of additional resources.

His quote above
That is how I interpreted it.
Just giving my thoughts

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#6

Okay, I understand. It might be a tool in the tool bag under the right conditions with the right amount and kind of resources to pull it off in an area conducive to that tactic.

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#7

Area not seen in daylight, unless the ground is flat and the roads are set up in a grid system you put the firefighters at great risk scattering them out in the green going after spots. With the fuel moistures and POI we are experincing this season why increase the risk factor to save a few acres? With a new start and the fire is still small and your a local resource this is a tactic that is useable. But when resources are stretched and your from out of the area its very very risky. Thats my 2 cents. Carry on, be safe out there.

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#8

Done it many times

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#9

One of the things most firefighters learn with experience is to be able to anticipate the micro-environment on a minute by minute status what the fire should do. At each moment, a firefighters mental focus should be on those micro influences that cause the fire to act. This refers to the type of fuel, the slope, the aspect in relation to wind, the behavior of the wind, how the fire has been reacting to all the above, etc.

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#10

I agree. A coordinated effort as the Original Poster has described above is exactly how many fires are controlled and his map example shows a very typical strategy: create a holding line, often fire off from that line, have safety zones and escape routes in place and known, have contingency lines, have resources to back up the plan.

That last one is generally tricky as we have been spread extremely thin over these last few seasons. But what was extremely helpful to us on an assignment last season was the help of the Bell AH-1 Cobra Helco calling out spots the size of a baseball as they landed in the green on the leeward side.

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#11

The 10s, 18s, checklists etc. are VITAL to firefighter safety but they are not rules that cannot be broken, instead they are in place to ensure we understand risk and plan accordingly to mitigate those risks. Firefighting is risky in its most basic tasks but we analyze risk and operate within margins, have lookouts, trigger points etc.

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#12

The “10’s” are Standard Firefighting Orders. They are rules not to be broken. The 18 watch-out’s are indications you are facing increasing risk. As they come into play, you need to revisit your risks vs rewards analysis and if the rewards justify continuing your course of action, take appropriate measures to mitigate the increased risk as best you can. Ignoring the 10 though, for example, not being aware of weather conditions or forecasts or not knowing what your fire is doing, not having escape routes or safety zones, etc. is a sure road to disaster.

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#13

Exactly on point. To avoid backlash I would also throw a caviat that the 10’s are not to be broken, however the environment can become malleable as you gain experience and understand what situations can classify as valid safety zones or lookouts etc.

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#14

Very good point. Thank you for adding it.

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#15

I want to be clear that I didn’t suggest disregarding either the 10s or the 18s.

Without a concrete safety zone, not just a place to run to IF things go south and a plan to get there, is inviting disaster. Having or permitting green between you and the fire is like standing up and shouting behind enemy lines, “I am here!”

I understand that escape routes and safety zones (not TRAs!) are a fundamental practice to safe wildland firefighting. Safety zones exist in the green just as much as they do in the black, more so if there is time to deploy resources (dozers!) to create and improve them. Each mobile unit would have to maintain its own situational awareness and be ready to, either on command or on its own recognizing a worsening situation, retreat to a safety zone.

A fully sketched out map would have to include numerous safety zones in the yellow area, identified as such, perhaps numbered as is done with drop points.

Red and green paint on mobile equipment certainly don’t repel embers, but by the same token, nor do they attract them. So I don’t accept the analogy to coming under an intelligent opponent’s direct or indirect (weapons) fires, as in a military context.

The question here, which I don’t know, is how much time a mobile attack unit might have to recognize that they are now in an untenable situation and then smoothly move to a pre-identified safety zone.

I appreciate you quoting specific watch-outs because I think they are very valuable to the discussion.

  • Safety zones and escape routes not identified.

Safety zones and escape routes would be fundamental to this technique. It occurs to me that the trigger point for withdrawal would be the potential threat to the escape routes rather than the safety zones. For example dense vegetation on the shoulders of key roads would make this tactic untenable.

  • Constructing line without safe anchor point.

I have to disagree here. The units following this tactic are not constructing new line, except in the broadest sense of not allowing embers to become established beyond an existing line.

  • Attempting frontal assault on fire.

This is not a direct frontal assault. In the example above, the fire is west and south of the control line and the forces are operating north and east of that control line, in the yellow area.

However, this is an offensive rather than a defensive tactic, and relies on weight of firefighting capability to see and suppress embers and small ignitions. An IA tactic in a campaign situation?

  • Unburned fuel between you and the fire.

Absolutely. This is the point of the tactic.

The opposite extreme is to say that wildland firefighters can only follow a campaign fire around and nibble on its burned heel and flanks as it changes direction, until weather stalls it and/or it burns out.

  • Getting frequent spot fires across line.

Yes and no. Mitigating this threat is the purpose of the tactic. If adequate resources are not available, attempting this tactic would be a recipe for disaster. Certainly the forces attempting to hold the line should retreat once spot fires make their own situation potentially difficult - this would mean a general retreat to beyond the fire’s reach, or to the next pre-planned control line and start building that.

The fundamental questions would be “how frequent?” and “when does the frequency rise to the point that the tactic is no longer tenable?”

I appreciate you sharing the burn over situation and I’m glad only two minor injuries resulted. However, the crew by definition was deployed without a vehicle and there were no structures to use as TRAs. I don’t know without specific timelines, but the impression is somewhere between a few minutes and half an hour. Those would not be the forces appropriate to this tactic unless the crew had two or three pickup trucks.

Thanks for the feedback. I find it very valuable and I appreciate your time.

#16

Ff13, I don’t think what you described in your example are the conditions he described,

On the “green” side of the proposed/completed dozer break on your map (Div BB) the terrain does not look conducive to his described tactic, there is no road system as described and the contours must like each other since they are so close together in many places. Without us being able to chat about all the particulars and me being able to get a better read on the map, I don’t think we are on the same page.
I love the idea of having Helco or AirTac up there calling in fixed and rotary wing drops to support boots on the ground in the green putting out spots, but, “if your plan lives by the air it will die by the air.” Look no further than yesterday’s CA-SQF-French Fire

All aircraft off the fire due to high turbulence

There are a myriad of tactical tools available to an astute tactition, many tools are time tagged and environmentally constrained (the fire or physical environment). What he described has some very narrow parameters of use. derivatives of that tactic have been done, many successfully, but remember that good luck is not a substitute for good tactics. When the column is bending over and obscuring the sun and the roar is heading your direction and embers are dropping left, right, in front and in back of you, if someone says “lets try that tactic of spreading out in this thousand acres of open field and watch for spots over the line back there,” I am inclined to disagree. Yes, we do something like that all the time in WUI and structure defense, but the house you are at or stay at better have a safe zone around it if your gonna stay and defend – not just hundreds of feet in the green watching for spots.

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#17

That is correct, as I typed this quickly I misspoke.

The 10s are fundamental guidelines designed to reduce danger to firefighters. When used appropriately they enable companies to safely work in hazardous areas because they have the ability to get an early warning of any serious hazard and have the ability to escape to a safety zone before a change in fire behavior could cause an entrapment.

#18

Yes, this could be a case of Apples and Oranges!

#19

They are called 10 Standard Firefighting Orders for a reason. They are not called 10 Fundamental Guidelines. They are Orders. If one takes the time to read non-PC watered down SAIT reports, each one has multiple Order which were not adhered to a substantial causal determinations.

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#20

@Ff13 what you described with the Cobra can be done geospatially direct from the aircraft into ATAK. They could mark them all as they got established. All within the possibility right now. The COBRA has all the stuff on it right now. they could even give you the video direct as well.

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